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DERRIDA AT THE MULTIPLEX:
WHY DECONSTRUCTION DISCONCERTS THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESTABLISHMENT
Kanavillil RAJAGOPALAN1
ABSTRACT:  ▪ Focusing largely on the debate in the philosophy of  language 
between Searle and Derrida on the subject of  speech act theory, this essay reveals 
a fundamental impasse between textualist (or deconstructive) and systematic 
(or philosophical) reading. It asserts that deconstruction’s insistence on the 
irreducible heterogeneity and plurality of  textual meaning renders it inassimilable 
within the more homogenizing systems of  meaning that are dominant within 
the philosophical establishment. For Rajagopalan the legacy of  deconstruction 
is constituted, at least in part, by this ongoing resistance to assimilation within 
the philosophical mainstream.
KEYWORDS:  ▪ Speech act theory. Performativity. Textualism. Searle. Heterology. 
Platonism.
The way in which the specter of  deconstruction continues to haunt the 
philosophical establishment has been evident for quite some time in the hostility 
with which the work of  Derrida is often met by philosophers. During an interview 
with Steven R. Postrel and Edward Feser (2000), for instance, John Searle was asked 
whether he thought that Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida (with both of  whom the 
interviewee had had bitter altercations in the past) were “making bad arguments” or 
“just being misread”. Searle responded to the question in the following terms:
With Derrida, you can hardly misread him, because he’s so obscure. Every time 
you say, “He says so and so,” he always says, “You misunderstood me.” But if  
you try to ﬁ gure out the correct interpretation, then that’s not so easy. I once 
said this to Michel Foucault, who was more hostile to Derrida even than I am, 
and Foucault said that Derrida practiced the method of  obscurantisme terroriste 
(terrorizing obscurantism). We were speaking French. And I said, “What the 
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hell do you mean by that?” And he said, “He writes so obscurely you can’t 
tell what he’s saying, that’s the obscurantism part, and then when you criticize 
him, he can always say, ‘You didn’t understand me; you’re an idiot.’ That’s the 
terrorism part.” And I liked that. So I wrote an article about Derrida. I asked 
Michel if  it was OK if  I quoted that passage, and he said yes.
Of  all the possible ways one might begin to discuss this anecdote, the one 
sentence that particularly caught my attention was Searle’s apparently off hand 
remark that, “We were speaking French.” I began by wondering why Searle made a 
point of  registering that at all. Given that the two interlocutors belonged to diff erent 
nationalities and spoke two distinctly diff erent languages, it must be obvious to 
anyone that their dialogue must have taken place in either of  the two languages: 
English or French. That is to say, either of  them must have had to speak the other’s 
language. But what diff erence would it have made if  it had been one or the other, or, 
for all you know, a third one? Or, at the very least, why at all should Searle consider it 
so important to mention the fact that Foucault was speaking in French, not English? 
It dawned on me that it is perhaps a very useful point at which to start an inquiry 
into what makes the Berkeley philosopher and his French counterpart – this time, 
I have Derrida in mind, not Foucault – so radically and diametrically opposed to 
each other on almost every important question in philosophy, as the famous debate 
between the two in the pages of  Glyph clearly demonstrated (DERRIDA, 1977a, 
1977b; SEARLE, 1977). 
It is worth spending some time parsing that sentence. Assuming that Searle 
did not introduce that sentence into his response just to ﬂ aunt his familiarity 
with and ﬂ uency in French, we are left with the only sensible alternative by way 
of  a plausible explanation: Searle was anxious to press home the important point 
that his interlocutor, namely Michele Foucault, was at that time speaking his own 
mother-tongue and that the expression obscurantisme terroriste that Searle cited in his 
response was Foucault’s own, not a gloss or a paraphrase by Searle. The fact that 
the expression obscurantisme terroriste is unmistakably in French does mean something 
but should not be allowed to detract from the point just made. Searle was, it seems, 
anxious to drive home the point that it was a faithful reproduction of  Foucault’s own 
words, ipsis litteris. In other words, in a face-to-face, one-on-one conversation Searle 
claims to have had with Foucault, there was no possibility he could have misheard 
the Frenchman speaking his own language, nor misinterpreted him (a possibility that 
is further ruled out by the latter’s gesture of  granting the permission to quote him). 
But then there is another and, as it turns out, a fundamentally more important 
and crucial aspect of  Searle’s use of  the expression attributed to Foucault that merits 
further exploration. Not only is it being claimed to be Foucault’s own and one made 
in Foucault’s own language or his mother-tongue, French, but there is the further 
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assumption that there can be no confusion whatever when one is speaking one’s own 
mother-tongue. That’s to say, when one is speaking one’s own language, there can be 
no slip, as it were, between the cup and the lip, between what one wants, intends to 
say, and what one ends up saying (whether the same thing can happen when one is 
listening to someone else speaking their native language which happens to be diff erent 
from one’s own is a moot point, but never mind that for the time being.). Now this is 
the kind of  thing that often happens when one is speaking someone else’s language. 
One ends up saying things that are not what one would have liked to say had one 
been in a position to “speak out” one’s mind in an otherwise unrestrained manner. 
The foreign language acts in this case as a kind of, as it were, ﬁ lter that retains some 
of  the vital parts of  the speaker’s putative intentions and, sometimes, even distorts 
the ﬁ nal outcome irremediably. Now, all this is part of  the conventional wisdom on 
what goes on when one speaks and also part of  what Searle seems to be assuming 
as uncontroversial.
In one way, the bone of  contention between John Searle and Jacques Derrida 
over the legacy of  Austin (among other things) can be described as whether or not 
one is entitled to claim privileged access to someone else’s intended meanings simply 
on the basis of  having been with that person at the same time and same place as 
when he or she is supposed to have said certain things. In other words, can anyone 
be absolutely certain that they have stumbled upon the real person with his real 
intentions – and not, say, a persona? Searle would seem to be absolutely convinced that 
the answer must be in the affi  rmative: provided some (in his view) basic conditions 
are met. First and foremost is a question of  physical proximity that can guarantee that 
the things said by that person can be within one’s earshot. The fact that the person 
said those things in his or her own language would be another. (Once again, we will 
overlook for the moment the caveat about the receiving end mentioned earlier, so 
that our conversation doesn’t get bogged down even before it gets started.)
It should come to us as no surprise that the exchange between Derrida and 
Searle that ﬁ lled the pages of  Glyph should continue to appear to the latter as having 
been an animated conversation between two deaf  persons. However, Jonathan 
Culler (1981, p.16) has insisted that what went on there was “John Searle’s egregious 
misunderstanding in his ‘Reiterating the Diff erences: A Reply to Derrida’” (emphasis 
added). On his part, Searle is equally convinced that there was no misreading Derrida 
simply because it is simply impossible to read Derrida. At the very least, Searle 
continues to believe (or claims he does) that Derrida always is far too slippery and 
evasive for someone to pin any deﬁ nite and unequivocal claim onto him: “Every time 
you say, ‘He says so and so,’ he always says, ‘You misunderstood me.’” Searle might 
have just as well said “Well, he speaks a diff erent language altogether.” Because, if  
one considers it, that is what makes a language so decidedly diff erent from one’s own. 
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Two persons, each speaking a completely diff erent and mutually incomprehensible 
language, are engaged in a conversation of  sorts between the deaf. This means that 
what guarantees the sameness of  the language is, in the ﬁ nal analysis, the possibility 
of  real communication between the two sides and not the presence of  any common 
linguistic core shared by the two (RAJAGOPALAN, 2001). 
What this shows, in any case, is that Searle’s observation that Foucault was 
speaking French when he made that remark about Derrida begins to sound at once 
revelatory of  deep-seated assumptions about the whole business of  meaning-
making as well as, perhaps unbeknownst to Searle himself  – or so it would seem – 
of  a more profound, if  contradictory, truism: Foucault’s remark in French, with all 
its Parisian ﬂ avor and ﬁ nesse, could not have been more English at its Anglo-Saxon 
best to Searle’s ears. At least, we have Searle’s own testimony that it was crystal-clear 
to his ears. And how else could Foucault have made it so clear to Searle than in 
the latter’s own mother-tongue, the only one where he is presumably completely at 
home according to conventional wisdom? Once we come to terms with this peculiar 
situation, I think we have can have a ﬁ rst approximation to or at least an interesting 
take on Derrida’s description of  deconstruction in Memoires as “plus d’une langue – 
both more than one language and no more of  a single language” (DERRIDA, 1986, 
p.15). 
So the transmission or transference of  meaning is the same whether it takes place 
between languages or between two persons speaking the same language. As long as 
transference in some way, shape or form is believed to have taken place at all, it does 
not matter whether or not the two languages are deemed diff erent. What Derrida’s 
determination of  deconstruction as “plus d’une language” suggests is that we must let 
go of  our long standing expectation that such transference must result in a stable, 
univocal meaning that can be easily grasped and circumscribed, since transference of  
meaning is always inevitably in excess of  itself, always precisely plus d’une langue. It is 
the ultimate testimony to the inevitability that all reductive modalities of  logic, which 
emerge in response to such linguistic excess, must remain constitutively inadequate 
to the idealized task they set for themselves (RAJAGOPALAN, 2005, 2009). It is this 
deconstructive axiom that Searle implicitly contests since he is anxious to make the 
point that there is no question whatsoever of  his having misread Derrida (or Richard 
Rorty, for that matter). 
The question of  misreading simply doesn’t arise, Searle would have added, 
because he was rigorously following the rule-book on reading. As far as Searle is 
concerned, reading is a process of  excavating a text by delving deep down until 
one reaches its bedrock – meaning. In the process, language is something to be 
breached, passed through – on the way to the stable bedrock of  its meaning. Had 
Foucault been speaking English at the time of  the conversation that Searle refers 
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to, the chances of  a misrepresentation would by all means have existed, but not so 
given the fact that he was speaking his own language. With misrepresentation at the 
source, things would have been hopelessly diffi  cult (though not hopelessly beyond 
recovery of  what Foucault had wanted to say; some careful probing would have 
clariﬁ ed matters). But, to repeat the point, not when the words are taken from the 
very source of  meaning. For Searle, that is where meaning is, as it were, glued to the 
very word mouthed by the speaker where there can be no mistaking it, no misreading 
what the speaker meant to say. 
But Derrida would be quick to respond, what you read is a text, never meaning 
ipsis. In fact, all that one is confronted with – every time and all the time – is the text. 
Il n’y a pas de hors-texte, to quote his trademark claim. Derrida (1995) returns to this 
theme in his essay called “Khôra” wherein he draws attention to the importance of  
distinguishing between the “philosophy” of  Plato and Plato’s “text”. It is needless to 
point out that Derrida’s observation would apply to anybody’s philosophy for that 
matter or any philosopher’s (or any one’s) views or opinion on anything whatsoever. 
It would, for instance, apply to Searle’s remark on Foucault’s opinion of  Derrida cited 
at the beginning of  this paper. But let us get back to what Derrida has to say apropos 
of  Plato’s philosophy. He writes that “The philosophy of  Plato is an abstraction 
and a simpliﬁ cation, while the text from which it has been excised is complex and 
heterogeneous, a multiplex of  innumerable threads and layers” (DERRIDA, 1995, 
p.81). But what of  the philosophy that has been handed down to us through the 
generations or what we have been used to calling Platonism? Isn’t there such a thing 
out there in the world? Derrida’s response to this question is that “Platonism […] 
is one of  the eff ects of  the text signed by Plato, for a long time, and for necessary 
reasons, the dominant eff ect, but this eff ect is always turned back against the text” 
(DERRIDA, 1995, p.82). In an irony that speaks directly to philosophy’s ongoing 
frustration with deconstruction, Derrida insists here that the textual “multiplex of  
innumerable threads and layers” from which the abstraction of  Platonism emerges is 
thus at odds with the latter’s own commitment to the values of  ideality and univocity. 
And in its return to this multiplex, deconstructive reading threatens to lift the textual 
suppressions and repressions that have facilitated Platonism’s long ascendancy.
Commenting on the passage above from “Khôra”, John Caputo (1997, p.83) 
remarks that Derrida’s distinction between the philosophy of  Plato and the text of  
the Greek philosopher “[...] parallels the dominant-reproductive and transgressive-
productive readings of  Plato.” Caputo’s timely intervention is a reminder that at no 
moment should we lose sight of  the fact that we are not pitting Plato’s text against 
something other than a text, as the received wisdom would have it. When all is said 
and done, the only diff erence between the Platonic philosophy and the Platonic text 
turns out to be how we read each of  them. Or, perhaps more importantly, how we 
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typically react to each of  them. The reading that results in Platonic philosophy is the 
one authorized by custom as well as the weight of  the Establishment that zealously 
guards that custom; whereas the one that looks to the text for a fresh reading is, in 
that very decision to take a fresh look at the text, going against the grain and, in so 
doing, transgressing against customary practices. But, even more signiﬁ cantly, the 
former is re-producing already established meanings while the latter is producing 
hitherto unnoticed meanings or meaning-potentialities whose very possibility of  
ever being discovered was concealed from us by the Establishment’s tight control 
over our interpretive freedom. While the former toes the offi  cial line, the latter 
threatens to disrupt it. 
That would explain the reluctance on the part of  those speaking on behalf  of  
the Philosophical Establishment even to admit that a “wayward” member from its 
own ranks can make any sense at all. “With Derrida, you can hardly misread him, 
because he’s so obscure.” Searle is saying that there can be no misreading of  Derrida, 
because to concede it would be tantamount to admitting there is a proper way to 
read him. But his style is so opaque, so obscure. It goes against the very grain of  
philosophy – at least, Searle’s way of  conceiving of  philosophy – according to which 
language should not be allowed to obstruct the smooth passage of  meaning between 
minds. That is what makes philosophy so radically and uncompromisingly diff erent 
from literature, he might have noted. That is why Rorty gives him the jitters every 
time he refers to philosophy as but a branch of  literature.
As a matter of  fact, there is no dearth of  examples in the history of  
philosophy where those threatening to become its recalcitrant members have been 
reviled and dismissed for complicity with language and rhetoric. Nietzsche’s name 
comes to mind immediately. With his self-confessed passion for language and his 
love of  tropes and penchant for aphorisms, Nietzsche was an easy target for the 
philosophers of  his time who, speaking on behalf  of  the Establishment, lost no 
time in mercilessly lambasting him and paying him a most vicious left-handed 
complement by extolling his ﬁ ne command of  the German language. More recently, 
J. L. Austin was subjected to a similar treatment whereby his masterpiece How to Do 
Things with Words was bowdlerized and sanitized of  all its textual “excesses” in the 
form of  light-hearted banter and touches of  humor, giving way to the more austere 
and sober theory of  speech acts, with John Searle himself  as the chief  architect and 
champion of  the new theory (RAJAGOPALAN, 2000). Both Nietzsche and Austin 
bear unmistakable testimony to what the philosophical Establishment is capable of  
in dealing with potential dangers to its traditional ways of  going about its business 
(RAJAGOPALAN, 1994).
With reference to the question of  style in philosophy, Stanley Cavell (1991, 
p.1333) argues that
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If  professional philosophers were asked whether philosophizing demands 
anything we would think of  as a style of  writing, their answer, I guess, would 
waver because their philosophical motivation in writing is less to defend a 
style than to suppress style or to allow it in ornamental doses.
Philosophers are wont to disavow all allegations of  having a style and claim 
that their writing is totally rid of  style. Their texts are, in other words, claimed 
to be totally transparent, with pure signiﬁ eds on public display for the beneﬁ t 
of  all and sundry. When Searle accuses Derrida of  writing in a style that is “so 
obscure,” he is alleging that his French counterpart has broken the sacred covenant 
of  philosophy, namely, the undertaking to expose one’s ideas in as transparent a 
fashion as possible. In eff ect, then, Searle is accusing Derrida of  being anything 
but a philosopher. 
Here we come to the most crucial question of  all. Why is it that the Establishment 
gets upset whenever the name of  Jacques Derrida is even mentioned? I think the 
answer is clear: his philosophy is so radically uncompromising that, in order to come 
to grips with it, one has to leave in suspension a good deal of  the opinion reçue on 
matters relating to the very business of  philosophy, how it has traditionally carved 
out a place for itself  in opposition to literature, and how it has over the years built a 
reputation as a discourse that has divested itself  of  all traces of  style. 
Before we round off  this discussion, a brief  remark on the quote from the 
interview with Searle with which we embarked on the discussion. Searle’s remark 
to the eff ect that the question of  misreading Derrida simply does not arise because, 
no matter how hard one tries, one cannot make sense of  what he says is indicative 
of  a categorical refusal to take Derrida in his own words, of  a prior decision to 
not even try to understand him. As we have seen, not trying to understand what he 
has to say and brushing him aside as a serious interlocutor to contend with is a 
strategy long tried and tested in philosophy but, like the specter of  Marx, of  which 
Derrida (1994) has spoken at length and has spoken so poignantly, the specter of  
Derrida himself  must – now that he is no longer physically present in our midst – 
haunt establishment philosophy for ever. That is the true afterlife of  the Derridean 
enterprise of  deconstruction. All that is left for us is to exclaim with Hamlet: “The 
time is out of  joint: Oh cursed spite, / That ever [we were] born to set it right.” This 
is the real state of  our debt and the true work of  our mourning.
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RESUMO ▪ : Baseando-se em grande medida no debate, na ﬁ losoﬁ a da linguagem, entre Searle 
e Derrida, acerca da teoria dos atos de fala, o presente ensaio revela um impasse fundamental 
entre uma leitura textualista (ou desconstrutora) e uma sistemática (ou ﬁ losóﬁ ca). O texto 
defende que a insistência da desconstrução na heterogeneidade irredutível e na pluralidade 
dos sentidos textuais torna-a inassimilável pelos sistemas homogeneizadores de sentido que 
dominam o establishment ﬁ losóﬁ co. Para Rajagopalan, o legado da desconstrução é transmitido, 
ao menos em parte, por meio de uma resistência contínua à assimilação pelo mainstream 
ﬁ losóﬁ co.
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